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TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL FORMULA FOR REVENUE ALWCATION IN NIGERIA-
by
DON NNAEMEKA IKE··
10 INTRODUCTION
From the history of revenue allocation in Nigeria, it is evident that an objective formula with in·
temal consistency has long eluded the state agents entrusted with problem of searching for acceptable
solution. As the term implies, it is a continuous problem within the confmes of fiscal federalism. In
situations of this nature, negotiations and political considerations loom large in the determination of
the final outcome., But these consideration should not overlook the underlying economic and demo-
graphic factors on which an optimal solution must be based. In Nigeria we have settled for ad hoc
solutions depending on the prevailing concentration of political power. The experience is that those
with repository of power would want to direct and allocation formula in their own favour. Con·
sequently terms like evea development, derivation, equality of state, population, national interest, are
manipulated to suit each area's economic interest.
e essential features of fiscal federalism require that:-
(a) Functions be allocated between the central and state Governments, with the necessity for each
Government to be endowed with enough fiScal powers to be able to carry its functions.
(b) Both Central and State Governments should have fiscal autonomy which implies freedom to
disburse funds.
(c) All Governments should have adequate and elastic resources to meet their needs and respon-
sibilities.
(d) Economy and efficiency should be maximised in the process of revenue collection and dis·
bursement. 1bis is flouted by the Nigerian decentralised systems.
e) The Federal authority has supervening powers of revenue re-distribution. Thus resources could
be transferred from one State to the other for purposes of achieving economic stability and
even development.
An efficient formula between the centre and the states should satisfy these broad principles. The
Federal and State Governments have political autonomy with exclusive and concurrent powers. Thus
the states should also be endowed with adequate fIScal capacity to match with their responsibilities
.regardless of the gap between fiscal need and available resources.
A State may generate substantially more revenue than the others. If the- state is allowed to retain
and disbUISe the entire revenue it would defeat a larger national goal of even national development
and this is potentially disintegrative. Hence the need for additional powers of the federal authority fo
a more even distribution of the National resource endowment to make for inter-regional equity and
alanced development.
.nu.s paper was written in l'J81 immediately after the Joint Finance Committee of the National Assembly passe,
the Re7enue Allocation Bill that was later succe·ssfully challenged in the law court.
**Dr. Ike is the-Head, Department of Finance and InsuIance, Institute of Management and Technology, bn~uI
Nigeria.
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Nigeria was un as a unitary Government until 1946 with the coming f the Richards Constit tion.
As a Unitary Government there was no need for revenue allocatiOll., since the central authority had
only provincial administrators to cater for. In 1946 with the Richards Constitutio and the three
regional set·ups, the need arose to allocate revenue to the J{egions. Phillipson Cklmmission was
appointed to study and make recommendations on the implemen ation of the new system.
Philhpson identified what he called "declared revenue", which Was regional revenue collectible and
disbursable within the regions. These revenue sources included duect taxes, receipts from licenses,
mining rents, fees of court~ and offices as well as receipts of rent from Government property and
earnings from departments
On the allocation of non-declared revenue to the states, Phillipson considered two criteria, deriva-
tion and the need tor even development. He adopted derivation because he believed that regions should
be encouraged to learn financial responsibilit and restraint. They have to learn to sper-r'I nly what
they can contribute to the national revenue.
This was the principle of derivation which would allocate to each region a share of non-declared
revenue proportionate to its contribution of such r venues
Non·declared gran ts were to be paid to the regions as follows:-
North 46 per cent
West 30 per cent
East 4 per cent
The principle was not only detrimental to national integration and even developmen but was
found unworkable. It created problems for the East and bitter wranglings in its pplicatiofl. Thus this
principle was rejetted in 1950. The Hicks·Phillipson commission discarded derivation and emphasised
a weighted population measure for the non·declared revenue which accounted for 94% of the total
revenue.
The importance of Hicks.Phillipson commission was that it rejected derivation as the primary
prmciple of revenue allocation and introduced other cri e ia namely: independent revenue, need and
national interest aU designed to make for effectiv fIScal federalism. This however still causeo 015-
affection among the regions and is said to be contributo y 0 the constitutional crisis of 1953.
Other Revenue panels were Chick Commission of 1953, R.lismen Commission of 1958, Binns
Commission of 1-964, Dina Commission of 1968 Aboyade Technical Committee of 1977, and the
present Okigbo Commission of 1979. Chick Commission emphasised derivation, Raismen Commission
de-emphasised this principle. Under R.lismen, a newly styled distributable poo account was establishe
The Binns equation'was not substantially different from Raismen's except for a new Wlquantiflable
principle of fmancial comparability in distribution of the Distributpble Pool ACCOQot. The Dina
Commission advocated a Special Grants Account to be operat'ed by a fiscal and plalmrng Commission,
but this was rejected by the Federal do~mmentK The analysesot the rious recommendations are
as shown by Phillips (1975), Teriba (1966), and Nwosu ( 980).
The Aboyade Technical Committee went ahead to separate revenue jUrisdiction of state and
Federal Go'f'tlrnments and to identify a State's Joint Account to e shared amongst the States and
Federal Go'f'tlmment a.ccording to the following principles:Equali y of access to development
opportunities, National minimum standard for national integration, Absorptive- capacity, Independent
revenue and minimum tax effort. and Fiscal efficiency. The National Constituent Assembly of 1978
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rejected the criteria used on the basis of its dubious statistical foundations and measurement problems.
The criteria were not amenable to objective quantification, and depending on assumptions made
couJd lead to entirely different results. Subsequently the Federal Government rejected the formula
and set up the Okigbo Review Panel in 1979.
2. PRINCIPLES TO BE CONSIDERED
An optimal revenue allocation formula should answer to the broad objectives of inter·regional
quity and balanced national development. It must not look askance at the essential features of fiscal
federalism as itemised above which involved autonomy, adequacy, cen trality, efficiency, and redis-
tributional capacity of the federal authority.
The recurring principles: running through the above-analysis and in the other referenced articles are
the following:-
I. Derivation.
2. Population.
3. Even National Development
4. Need
5. Absorptive capacity
6. Fiscal Efficiency
7. National Interest
8. Equality of States
. Total School Enrolment.
Derivation recognises the need to retajn incomes in States thta produce such incomes. II is argued
that in order to inculcate financial responsibility, and fiscal prudence in revenue management, states
should learn to spend only what they contribute to the national purse. limier this system thus,
poorly endowed states would remain poor and well endowed ones would grow richer, all in the same
country. This would negate the need for even national development, aml tllis would be potentially
disruptive in the context of national economic integration.
But the apologists of derivation could have a case. They have pointed to the deleterious effect of
mineral exploitation on environment, destroying ecological zones for agriculture and life. Such des-
truction goes beyond the act ual monetary compensation paid out to the real land owners. Additio·
nally there is need to transform areas of mineral potential to industrial zones as agriculture is inhibi-
ted by exploitation creating quasi-technological unemployment. Areas of oil and mineral potential
would consequently require more revenue for the transformation that may be required to ensure
equilibrium in the relevant micro-economy.
Thus, although a de-emphasis of derivation is recommended, it should not be completely scrapped
peciall/in dealing with oil royalties and rent.
Population could be used as a relevant index for need with the assumption of eq ual per-caput mini·
mum need; population would approximate the economic needs of each State. Since maximization of
peoples welfare is a relevant state objective. population and; or percapita income must be seen as an
important co-State variable.
Phillipson in 1945 considered population as the best available measure of human needs and very
simple to understand. Phillipson, however did not pursue the implication of this conclusion and thus
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left ou population from his formula. Since the Hicks-Phillipson review of 1950, population has been
recognised as an im rtant variable, until the A oyade review w 'ch sought for ohje tive criteri hat
could not be manipulated by public officials.
The problem ith population i the Nigerian situation is the inaccuracy of the existing population
data. It is argued by some that any emphasis on population woul lea to large scale popula ion in·
tlation by States who would ant t use this r ess to incr ase their allocati n. It is necessar to
state that reve ue allocation is not the nly incentive for sta es to seek to inflate their population.
The desire for enhanced political rep esentation in the c nt e an inter·r giona s uggles or
hegemony are other strong inducem nts for rigging the population count As a result, we should not
throw a ay the b by with the bathwater. Thus e forts should be made t hand over to the present
an future generations of Nigerians accurate population data. This would g rant a fai ,si pie an
equitable distribution of revenue with population as an important variable. 1 would add arentheticaUy
that in advanced capitalist countries, U.S.A. for instance, population is the most important criterion
for revenue distri ution accounting for about 90% of the shared evnue.
Even national development is not a quantifiable criterion. One of the broad objectives of revenu
a ocation is the achievement of even national development, since states have widely differing resource
endowment Hence the adde responSibility of the superior Federal auth rity to reo istr"b te reo
sources from the rich to t e poor states. h ,the use of criterion other than derivation is aimed at
achieving even and balanceu national development.
Need is amorphou and nebulous. Needs are limitless whil resources t satisfy them ar con·
strained by the fact of scarcit (N osu, 1980). Consequently in the context of a state s ructure, need
cannot be totally quantified or specifieu except by reference to population. Population should stiper-
sede :my further reference to need in an ppropriate revenue calculus.
Absorptive capacity, iiscalefficiency and nationalmtere t arc not easily quantifiable. Proxies could
be used to approximate the intluence of these variable, but these proxies cannot be made 0 jective
and acceptable to all states as they are likely to have dIfferential effects. There is evidence that all
States have very hIgh ab orptive capacity and as such this criterion should be ruled irrplevant in the
present 'igerian situation. States with high fiscal effiCiency should be able to collect and disburse
efficiently revenue sources within their exclusive Jurisdiction. National interest i not objective and has
hjgh political undertones; if incorporated into our revenue framework, it is likely to follow the Kdis~
tribution of political power and as such would be a source of polItical disputations. A Special Grant's
ccount, of negligible fiscal magnitude, could be created within the discretionary powers of the
Nation\ Chief Executive on the advise of a Fiscal and/or Plannmg Commission for use to attend to
national emergencies, disasters and ecological depredation. The author dId recomm nd tllis .
1977 memorandum (Ike 1977) to the Aboyade Technical Committee.
Equahty of state~ is a straIght forward democratl pnnciple. Although in actuality states are not
equal as they have differing size, popUlation and esource endo m nt; but SInce states have the same
auministratlve framework (namely Governors and state's executives, houses of legislature, civil service
and judicial systems) of largely equal size, the states are likely to incur sinuJar administrative I.:osts.
Thus the equality prrnciple with respect to states could have more than fictional and political implica-
tions (Nwosu, 1980). The principle should be accorded a place in an appropriate revenue distribution
calculus as a result of its consequential economic possibilities. The weight given to this principle should
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be kept as small as possible to reduce the demand for mushroom states which has gripped the nation.
Education has been accepted to have great inter-regional externalities. A State investing lughly in
education would benefit the nation with enlightened and educated work force available for the larger
economy. Consequently to encourage states to invest in education from primary to University level,
total school enrolment should be used for revenue allocation. Furthermore, as Anderson et. al., (I 963)
pointed out, 40% of pnmary enrolment is a threshold for economic development. As a result, an in·
ducement to States to emphasise school enrolment through a revenue framework could also lead the
states lIIto achieving far~ernational objectives.
Additionally, total schOOl enrolment could be used as an index of human absorptive capacity, with
states having high school enrolment being able to absorb further investment 1fl other sectors of their
economy in response to the economic force of factor complementarity.
3. AN OYl1MAL REVENUE FORMULA
30%
55%
5%
10%
.30
.55
.5
.10
The States and local governments should have certain Jurisdictions exclusive to them in order to
create some measure of f!.Seal autonomy for these States. Thus the main source of state generated
revenue should be personal income tax. Other sources of state revenue should be sales or purchase
taxes, football pools and other betting taxes, 'capital gains tax, stanlp duties, motor vehicle taxes and
licence fees. Local Governments should have jurisdiction for property tax, market and trading licences,
motor parks dues, and land registration fees.
All federally collected- revenue which should include import duties excise duties, export duties,
mining rents and"'royalties. petroleum profit tax, companies income. tax should be consolidated into
one account to be shared by the Federal, State and Local Governments. The Federal Government
should retain personal income taxes from external affairs officers and the Federal Capital territory.
The others should be shared 50% to the Federal Government, 40% to the state Governments jointly,
8% to the Local Governments Jointly and 2% special Grants Account, within the discretIonary juriS-
diction of the nation's Chief Executive to be disbursed on the advice of a Fiscal or Planning Com-
mission, especially for use to attend to national emergencies, disasters and ecological depradations.
The States account should be shared according to the following principles: population, derivation,
equality of states and total school emolment. Fifty five percent should be shared accordmg to popu·
lation, 5 per cent according to derivation, 10 per cent according to equality of states and 30%
according to the raw figures of total enrolment. Thus the criteria and their associated weights are as
foUows:-
I. Population
2. Derivation
3. Equality of States
4. Total School
enrolment
. Total 1.0 100%
There may not be much that is scientific about the above pattern of distribution, but it reflects the
author's qualitative ordering of the relative weights of the principles as elucidated in the above
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analysis. The formula woul do for now and .or the future, and it reflects th synthesis 0 the
priorised (antecedent facts four hec.kered fiscal evolution.
CONCL USJONS:
The Okigbo Commission recommen ed a formu a not substantially different from the ab ve
formula, except in the relat"ve weights assigned. This Olagbo recommendation went through the
Federal Executiv Council and the National Assembly. The Federal Government White Paper on
Okigbo's recommendations renected the C mmittee's rdering and the ielative weights with minor
modifications, but in the National Assembly new criteria were introduced that deviat d from th
optimality characteristics analysed above. For instanc Ian mass was injected into the revenue alloca-
tion ~cujus which to the author is a retrograde step in our historical fiscal evolution. Reven should
be meant for people and not for land. Land itse i!> an asset, and a state with abundant land mass
already has greater resource endowment. To give more money to sates with mor land are is
tantamount to "Carrying coal to Newcastle" .
in future the rational principles of population and school enrolment should be give enhanced
status if we are interested in economic development under conditions of political s ability. For
instance, in the U.S.A., revenue is dist 'b ted only on the basis of population. In the 200 years of
U.S. history, there ha been no demand for division ()f states into unviable units for th purpose of
denvin enhance fisca capacity from the common pool. It is an advantage for state to be large. If
states remain large, Nigeria as a nation is more likely to ben fit from economies of scale in the costs
of administration and other technological indivisibilities in capital investments. Thus a formula in the
line advocated would not only conduce to politica stability but also accelerate economic growth and
development.
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